


第7回人口問題と社会サービスに関する 特別委員会 配布資料

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配布資料



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第7回人口問題と社会サービスに関する
特別委員会議事進行予定

平成9年2月6日(木)
厚生省特別第1会議室
14時00分～16時00分

1. 開 会

2. 議 題

ドイツの出生率の動向と家族政策

講 師 Dr. Charlotte Höhn ドイツ国立人口研究所所長

3. 閉 会

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
Fertility and Family Policy in Germany -Experiences from one to two to one Germany-

Long-term fertility trends and determinants of low fertility

Germany belongs to those West and North European countries where demographic transition started relatively early. Indeed, fertility started to decline in the last quarter of the 19th century -about the time of the foundation of the German Empire in 1870/71- from an average number of births per woman of app. 5 children to below replacement level (of 2.5 children given the higher mortality of the time) already during World War I.

Fig. 1:

Total fertility rates for the calendar years 1871-1995




If we consider the demographically more valid completed fertility of female birth cohorts only women born before 1880 had the number of births necessary to replace the generation. None of the younger female generations in Germany reached the replacement level again.

Fig. 2:

Completed fertility of the female birth cohorts 1865-1955

Completed fertility per women



Source: Federal Statistical Office; Schwarz, K. (1991); own calculations
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This remarkably strong first fertility decline in Germany took place without modern contraceptives, of course. It was due to a number of circumstances which changed the value of children. The determinants of fertility decline are a bundle of factors which cannot possibly be separated. The interrelated single determinants vary in importance over time. The onset of fertility transition in Europe seems to be secularisation and modernisation in the 18th and 19th century. A feudal and clerical society changed under the impact of the philosophy of illumination and the weakening of the power of

the Catholic Church (I mention Protestantism and the ideals of the French Revolution which spread all over Europe during the Napoleonic Wars). The new, modern societies were oriented on individual achievement, on the individual and its possibilities and demands. Modern economy and industrialisation replaced the old feudal order towards republics and a civil society. One major factor - motor and necessity of modernisation- was mass education which became compulsory in Germany in the second half of the 19th century.

Education not only means knowledge and skills, it also entails a rational world view, a calculating spirit.

This rational view also relates to the value of children. Once children have no economic value in a world where children are forbidden to work economically, but must go to school with all the costs involved it is wise and rational to have few children and to wish that they too become economically successful members of society.

In addition, social security systems for protection in old age and in times of illness were introduced in many European countries. Incidentally, Germany was the first country which, under Bismarck, started a compulsory social security system and set an example for the new welfare society. Children were no longer necessary to provide help for their old or ill parents.

Education also spread to girls and women. Women's empowerment and education for all are the main pillars of the Cairo Programme of Action as the determinants of demographic transition in the Third World. And if this is true for the Third World why should it be different for the more developed countries ?


It is the motivation of couples and individuals to limit the number of children which is decisive. Fertility declined strongest in Germany from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century. It is important to mention that fertility was limited even against the explicit public policy, e.g. in Nazi-Germany. I will discuss the different German population-related policies later more extensively. In figure 2 we clearly see that cohort fertility remained constant up to the female birth cohorts of

1930/1935 who were born during the Nazi period and hence not exposed to its population policy. Only the period total fertility rate increased, largely due to timing effects.

For the post-war period we will have to study fertility trends in the two parts of the divided Germany. After reunification we use to call them the old federal territory (the west) and the former GDR (the east).

Fig. 3:


Total fertility rates in the old federal territory and in the former GDR 1960 - 1995



It is interesting to note that the period TFRs were quite similar in East and West Germany from 1950 up to 1975. We will see later that behind this similar trend there are a number of structural, behavioural differences.

Fig. 4:

Completed fertility in the old federal territory and the former GDR, female birth cohorts 1930 - 1965



A few comments on the baby boom in the late fifties and early sixties, which brought the period total fertility rates above replacement level, is appropriate. A comparison of the cohort with the period data reveals that this baby boom did not mean many more children per woman, as it was the case in the USA in the same period. Women born between 1930 and 1935 had a small increase of their final number of births of just + 0.1 children as compared to older cohorts. The effect of increasing TFRs was the demographic result of earlier marriage and shorter births intervals (see annex tables), timing effects, not the desire for larger families.

This baby boom was followed by a quite rapid fertility decline, the second fertility decline which brought fertility clearly below replacement level. What were the reasons ?

Since the sixties family planning reached a new quality due to the availability of modern contraceptives. A conception now could be carefully planned, which is something completely different from preventing a conception. There is time to consider the pros and cons of having a child or another child, a decision process which involves both man and woman. I am therefore deeply convinced that the low fertility in our modern societies is largely desired by both men and women.

We live today in Europe, in Japan and in other industrialized welfare states as well, in a society where most couples and individuals feel that two children are ideal and sufficient. Small groups still want more children. More pertinent for low fertility are those who do not want to have any children, those who consequently do not marry or those who wait and wait with their decision to have a family until it is either too late to have a baby for biological reasons or because they got used to the life without children. In all European countries age at marriage and at first birth increases, and the percentage childlessness is becoming larger. Germany has a quite long tradition of high childlessness due to the effects of the two World Wars with its enormous loss of men / potential husbands and fathers. Today, of course, the deliberate or the gradual decision against a life with children are the main factors.

Why is it so difficult to live a good family life in our modern society, why does it seem more gratifying to have no kids -or to have them not too early ? Our economy is blind for the needs of a family, it is based on individuals, on their availability, their mobility, their personal commitment. The more they are available the better chances they have for a career. Hence, singles or men (who still traditionally do not reserve too much time for the care of their kids) are best placed for a career. The family mother has to struggle with time schedules of the kindergarten, the school, the sport club, with shopping, and commuting if she has a job. Her time budget for the job and the family, but also for household chores if she is just a housewife, is always tight. If one in the family is sick, the family mother is expected to stay at home.

If a young women, usually well educated and with a nice job, considers together with her partner whether they should have a child, she is aware that she either has to give up her job including her own income or to work part-time with repercussions on her career and part of her income or to carry the

double burden of work and family. It is not a short term decision, it is not a reversible decision, she and her partner are committing themselves to 15 to 25 years of restricted financial and time allocation. This also applies to the partner though his time budget is less modified when he becomes a father. Of course, the household income per capita is reduced once a child is born to the couple. And it is not the employer who pays more in such an event. Economy is largely blind to the familial context: income is paid according to the personal individual performance. It is the state which redistributes income via family policy measures. There is, however, no state to my knowledge, which fully compensates the costs of children and the opportunity income of mothers. Honestly, there are not the means for such a compensation.

As a result of my reasoning I content that having a family is economically not the wisest decision. Children are born because people want to have a happy family, because they love children and want to see them develop as part of their own life. Parents therefore invest time and money and love in bringing up children.


Two children are the ideal number as opinion surveys clearly show. For a replacement fertility of 2.1 children per woman, allowing for 10 percent of childless women, it requires however 40 to 50 percent of couples who would be ready to have three children. Such couples wishing three or even more children became rare in the advanced societies - the main reasons have been mentioned.

Anyway, from 1970 to 1975, the two Germanies held the record of the lowest fertility rate in the world. But then in 1976, the ex-GDR launched a comprehensive population and social policy programme and the TFR climbed temporarily, however, not reaching replacement level in one single year. And after 1980 the TFR started to fall again. So in 1989, the year of the peaceful revolution and of the fall of the Berlin wall, the differences in fertility levels were not dramatic. With the opening of the frontiers, East Germans started to freeze there demographic decisions. It came to a spectacular drop in fertility, but also in nuptiality, divorce, and in abortion. This freezing of demographic decisions very likely emanates from the deep uncertainty about the personal future in a completely changed social, economic and legal surrounding. The former GDR is the only former socialist country which through accession to the

Federal Republic of Germany was not only freed and democratized, but which received the full legal and administrative system of West Germany with its social market economy and where state property was rapidly privatized and where communists were expelled from the civil service. Prizes become market driven, people had to apply for transfers and supports, people had to take decisions, something alien to people having lived for decades in a planned economy under party rule.

Fig. 5:

**Monthly total fertility rates in the old federal territory and the new states
1990 - August 1996**



Source: Federal Statistical Office,
own calculations

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Only recently, in 1995 fertility in the new states (Länder) of Germany started very slowly to increase.

A short history of family policy in Germany

- up to 1945

Discussions about measures in favour of families with several children started already before the First World War in Germany. Fertility declined rapidly since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and fertility reached replacement level already for marriages contracted in the twenties. This explains the interest of policy-makers and deputies in Germany since such early times.

Article 119 of the Weimar Constitution contains important elements of a family policy: "Marriage being the basis of family and of support and increase of the nation is under the special protection of the constitution. It resides on the equality of the sexes. It is the task of the state and the communes to maintain the purity and health of the family and to promote it socially. Families with several children are entitled to equalizing support. Motherhood may claim the protection and support of the state." This was a programme in the Weimar Republic inspired by discussions already under the German Empire.

In retrospect I hesitate to call these endeavours and plans of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic a demand for either family policy or population policy. It remained a discussion only until 1933.

In 1933 the Nazi government did not hesitate to launch an explicit population policy. This basically racist policy included marriage loans that were reduced after the birth of children and relieved after the birth of the third child, birth grants, the mother cross (as particular oddity), a total ban of abortion, but also child allowances and child rebates.

These measures were restricted to the German („Aryan“) population. They were accompanied by a ban of interracial marriage, and worse, the programme to „eradicate“ (kill) the „unworthy“ lives (mentally handicapped, jews, gypsies).

The racist principle of these political measures (and its catastrophic consequences) overshadowed the elements of family policy. These too were cancelled by the Allies after the Second World War.

- **in West Germany**

The history of family policy in the Federal Republic of Germany starts with a void and the stigma that family policy might be the dummy for a population policy. The article 6 of the Basic Law from 1949, the year the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, puts family and marriage under the special protection of official order. It is remarkable that this article is much less explicit than the Weimar one (which remained valid during the Nazi area).

While all "important" ministries were created in 1949, a ministry for family issues was established only in 1953.

The phase (I) of development of a family policy goes from 1955-1974. It covers the period of the christian-democrat governments up to 1966, the great coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD 1966-1969, and the first phase of the social-liberal coalition 1969-1974.

The usual measures, like child allowances and rebates for children in income taxation (but also splitting of spouses incomes since 1958 (i.e. taxable income x tariff x 2 = payable tax) were gradually developed. Since 1957, children over 18 still in education are considered by a special rebate which is higher when the child lives outside the parental household, While child rebates were initially (1950-1955) neutral to the rank order and only then differentiated, child allowance started for the third (and further) child in 1955, included the second child in 1961 with a lower amount, and a full gradient increasing up to the 5th child was introduced in 1964. The only minor change of the social-liberal government during phase I was an increase of the allowance for the second child.

The social-liberal government initiated a phase (II) of reform (1975-1982) of family policy. The considered child rebates as socially regressive and therefore replaced this measure by a much more

generous system of child allowances. It now comprised all children increasing from the first to the third child.

While the child allowance for the first child since then remained constant (and low), the other amounts were increased several times. Only in the last year of social-liberal rule (1982) the child allowance for second and third children was somewhat reduced (not for fourth and further children).

In 1977, monoparental families were granted a so-called "household rebate" in income taxation to give a compensation for the fact they do not enjoy the splitting advantage of income taxation of married couples.

Splitting was introduced in 1958 and remained since then controversial. It not only neglects the number (or even presence) of children, it also rewards the higher incomes particularly if the wife is not working. A suit of monoparental families to the constitutional court was successful and brought the "household rebate".

The social-democrats introduces already in 1971 a first new element of family policy with transfers to students. These payments were means-tested but the ceilings were lifted several times.

In 1980, a second new measure, a paid maternity leave of 6 months after delivery, was launched. Only active women could enjoy this measure (750 DM monthly after the legal full payment during 8-12 weeks) involving also a reemployment guarantee. It is interesting to note that the minister of labour was competent for this legislation.

The social-liberal government which was constantly reproached by the conservative opposition to neglect family policy was quite innovative and generous. These measures all reveal a strong social-political rationale too but clearly also belong to the tool kit of family policy.

At the end of 1982 the social-liberal government was relieved by a christian-liberal government. The few following years I would like to call phase (III) of reduction diet (1983-1985). Quite unexpectedly to all observers and in order to cure the general budgetary problems child allowances became means-tested with the result that one third of two-children families, one fifth of three-children families and 10 % of families with four and more children receive less child allowance.

Transfers to students since then were given as a credit only. In 1984, the monthly payment to young mothers up to 6 months after delivery was reduced from 750 to 510 DM.

A very small child rebate in income taxation was reintroduced in 1983. In 1984 a fund to protect unborn life was provided (abortion can be obtained by indication (including "other distress") since 1976). Chancellor Kohl in his political programme spoken in parliament in 1983 announced a completely new family policy.

The phase (IV) of the new family policy (since 1986) has however also traits of restoration. It reintroduced the so-called dual system of child allowances (System unchanged) and child rebates which are considerable and neutral to rank order. The latter will be increased in 1990, as will be the allowance for the second child. The household rebate for monoparental families was slightly increased in 1988.

The quasi new measure concerns prolonged and paid education leave. All mothers (or fathers) can claim it up to 10 months (1986-1987), 12 months (1988-VI/1989), 15 months (VI/1989-VI/1990) resp. 18 months starting July 1990 while the amount of 600 DM is means-tested after the 7th month of the child. Parents (usually the mother) who were economically active before the birth of their child have the guarantee of reemployment in their same position (in small firms in the same branch only).

In the 90ies finally the educational leave was extended up to the third birthday of the child. This allowed the mother who wanted to resume her economic activity to place the child in a kindergarten.

Really new was the recognition of one "baby-year" in the pension scheme which is granted for all women when they reach the age of 65. It has been extended to three years for all babies born after 1993.

- **Social political measures relevant for families**

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the social security system covers pensions, health service and unemployment, and long-term care.

The nonworking spouse and all dependent children are covered by the health insurance of the working spouse. If both are working two contributions to health insurance have to be paid. These are individual payments as a percentage of income. So a single person and a married father pay the same contribution if they earn the same income. But the health services are covered for either one (single person) or the whole family.

Social aid including assistance to the rent considers the family situation. It is given to low-income families or individuals.

There are very few nurseries for children under the age of three years. The coverage with kindergartens for children 3 to 6 years is sufficient. Parents have to pay a contribution. Single parents can partly deduct these payments in income taxation.

Most schools only function in the morning. Full day schools or boarding schools are the exception and usually very expensive (private).

Any arrangement of a family help (maid, nurse, etc.) is strictly private. There are possibilities to find a mother who minds additional children. Again only single parents can deduct part of the payment in income taxation.

Some of the Länder give additional help to families. These are partly longer (paid) parental leaves, family formation loans, programmes for single parents.

Family counselling services are provided by the communes, the welfare associations and the churches.

Family planning services are provided by "pro familia", the West-German member organization of IPPF. Contraceptive devices are legal and freely accessible, but they are not covered by health insurance. They are free of charge for persons on social aid. Only an abortion for medical reasons is refunded by health insurance.

- **population policy**

None of the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany pursued a population policy.

The reason to stigmatize population policy and to avoid even the impression to pursue a pro-natalist policy stems, of course, from the tragic abuse of population policy during the Nazi period.

In the answers to the Inquiries of the UN to governments, as in their country statement for the Cairo Conference on Population and Development, the Federal governments declared that family policy has its own task of equalizing burdens and does not require any demographic rationale. It does not regard it as its task to adopt a target for future birth rates. Freedom of decision for parents about the number and spacing of children they wish to have must be maintained.

The desired number of children indeed has to be taken seriously. It is a human right -first codified in 1968, repeated in the World Population Plan of Action of 1974 and reaffirmed in the Cairo Programme of Action of 1994- of couples and individuals to decide freely, informed and responsibly on the number and spacing of births of their children. If couples and individuals want no more than two children or one child or none, this their reproductive right has to be respected by everybody and by policy-makers in particular.

- **in the former GDR (East Germany)**

The East German government did not find it problematic -given the history of population policy in Nazi Germany- to start an explicit population and social policy in the seventies. The GDR indeed refused to be heirs of Nazi-Germany and claimed to be a completely new state and new socialist society. Other socialist countries, namely Hungary and Czechoslovakia, had already experimented with pronatalist measures in the sixties.


In 1976 a generous and comprehensive bundle of pronatalist measures was introduced including a marriage loan (only if the wife was younger than 28 years) that were reduced after the birth of children and relieved after the birth of the third child, a birth grant, paid maternity leave, and child allowances. An important additional feature was the availability of child-minding facilities for virtually all children over 1 year: creches, kindergartens, full-day school, school weekend and holiday camps. Mothers had no problem to go to work.

Nevertheless fertility did not reach replacement level in one single year (see fig. 3) and started to decline after 1980. Already before the fall of the wall, in 1989, the fertility levels in the then two Germanies were not very far apart. It is possible to believe, however, that without this demographic policy, the completed fertility in East Germany, would have fallen as rapidly as in West Germany (see fig.4).

The population policy of the GDR gave great preference to unmarried mothers (higher child allowance, longer maternity leave if no place in a creche was available -which meant a preference for creche places). As a result the illegitimacy ratio in East Germany sky-rocketed.

Fig. 6:

Illegitimacy ratio in the old federal territory and in the former GDR 1950 - 1995




Source: Federal Statistical Office

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Fig. 7:

Total first marriage rates in the old federal territory and the former GDR,
1960 - 1995



Source: Federal Statistical Office, own calculations


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To obtain a flat one had to be married. So marriage followed if the child had a place in the creche: most East Germans married and most were young while in West Germany more and more people postpone marriage and childbearing. The East German pattern of behaviour was partly influenced by the desire to leave the narrow parental household, to become independent (a socialist ideal), by the population policy (marriage loans only to young couples). The youthfulness of procreation is reflected both in the age-specific fertility rates and in the very low percentage of childless women.

Fig. 8:

Age-specific fertility rates in the old federal territory and in the former GDR , 1989 and 1995

per 1000 women in the corresponding age



Tab. 1: Childless women in the old federal territory and in the former GDR by birth cohorts 1896 - 1965 (in percent)

Birth cohorts	Old Federal Territory	Former GDR	Birth cohorts	Old Federal Territory	Former GDR
1901/1905	26	26	1931/1935	10	11
1906/1910	22	20	1936/1940	10	10
1911/1915	19	17	1941/1945	12	9
1916/1920	18	17	1946/1950	14	8
1921/1925	17	18			

Table 1 also surprises the interested observer with the remarkably high percentage of childless women born between 1901 and 1925. Here we have the effects of the two World Wars with their enormous loss of young men. The demographic result was a marriage squeeze with a high percentage of women who did not find a husband and remained unmarried and childless. In Germany this might have led to an image that not all women normally are mothers.

Tab. 2: Women in the old federal territory and the former GDR by birth order and birth cohorts, 1940 - 1970 (in %)

Birth cohorts	Old federal territory				Former GDR			
	0	1	2	3+	0	1	2	3+
1940	10,1	23,6	39,4	27,0	8,9	33,2	47,4	10,5
1945	13,3	26,9	39,4	20,4	8,5	33,0	47,7	10,8
1950	14,9	27,2	39,5	18,5	8,0	29,3	49,6	13,1
1955	19,4	24,3	38,5	17,8	6,0	25,7	53,7	14,6
1960	23,2	21,6	37,4	17,8	10,6	20,6	54,0	14,8

While the GDR succeeded to increase fertility in the short term it did not really result in an increase of the percentage of families with three children. The dominant pattern is the family with two children, quite in correspondence to the desired number of children. There are relatively more families with three and more children in West Germany, though also many more without children. If the motivation and the social setting for large families is no longer alive in a population any policy comes to its limits. To reach replacement level (allowing for only 10 percent of childless) 40 percent of the families must have three and more children. The third child is the obstacle for any hoped success of policy intervention to reach replacement fertility.

Overlap and Controversies between Family Policy and Other Policies

In the united Germany there is no population policy. Family policy and family-related policies described for West Germany now pertain to the whole country. The question remains why even a good and generous family policy does not encourage the childless to have children and those with one child to have a second. (In raising this question I will not comment on those who for biological reasons cannot fulfill their wish to have children).

As I already indicated repeatedly other policies with its own objectives have to be considered as conflicting with family policy. There are indeed many policies with an unintended, but usually negative effect on fertility. Some experts believe that the impact of indirect (unintended) political action, mainly of policies on education, emancipation, working conditions, housing and social security have a much stronger effect than direct family or population policies. It is to my mind ironical that with pro-natalist policies (where they exist) the state is trying to solve a problem that it partly created itself.

A rising level of education is necessary for economic progress, but it also enhances rationality in all decisions including reproductive behaviour.

The promotion of female emancipation is a constitutional request and, more and more, a political programme. Equal education, equal income, equal access in economic activity are important goals that, however, bring conflicts with having children. I believe that men too are not interested in many children. They too are rational, and a double income opens many alternatives to being tied down by children.

The modern working conditions are tailored to individuals and disregard the needs of families. Examples are working hours, holidays, commuting times, but also the shortage of part-time jobs, time-sharing, more flexibility.

Modern cities are also hostile to families. Housing becomes more and more expensive, or distances for commuting longer and longer. The heavy traffic is dangerous for children, Cars are needed (for commuting) or status symbols, and are expensive.

Social security for health and old age can be enjoyed even better without children. The former link between number of children and protection of old parents is cut since long. A double income assures a double pension from the individual point of view.

So a number of policies have shaped our modern society in a way that does not meet the needs of families and discourages the desire to have many children.

Policies of adaptation to demographic change

In West Germany and now in the united Germany there was no fear about the low fertility and the resulting population ageing.

In Germany, however, a set of policies of adaptation to population decline and demographic ageing has been discussed and developed already in the mid-seventies. In its answer to the 6th Inquiry of the UN on population the Federal government states: "In the two reports on population growth it has submitted up to now (Part 1, 1980, BT-Drs. 8/4437, Part 2, 1983, BT-Drs. 10/863), the Interministerial Working Group on Population Questions has shown that the problem of population decline with its long-term impact presents a constant political challenge ... The change in age structure will have repercussions in virtually all fields of government and society and require adjustment activities. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is taking account of these requirements in its planning".

Examples of such population-relevant policies are the reform of social security for health and old age, a re-structure of the education sector, specific measures for the aged (family care, increase of competence of the aged etc.).

There is a Federal Ministry of Family, Seniors, Youth and Women responsible for family policy. Certain additional programmes are run by some of the Länder. The Länder are responsible for the health infrastructure and the education sector. On the community level child care facilities are provided.

The Federal Ministry of Family has a scientific board for family matters, and an expert group for the family report.

An interministerial working group on population is chaired by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It has published two government reports on demographic trends and its consequences. Last year new population projections were published.

There are no groups which are opposed to family policy. But there is a general abstinence of population policy and all measures that might be considered as overtly pro-natalist.

There is no fear of population decline and demographic ageing. The consensus is on free decision of number and spacing of children. Family unions are, of course, demanding more equality in the economic situation of families. As to the governments since the seventies, a policy of adaptation is considered feasible to meet the problems of population decline.

Effects of Family Policy and Population Policy

Effects of Population Policy

A study of countries with a pro-natalist or a generous family policy on the efficacy on fertility has been carried out by Höhn and Schubnell in 1986 (see also Höhn, 1987).

Short-term effects can usually be observed. But the long-term effects are rather modest. In France plus 0.2 to 0.3 children per completed family size, in GDR plus 0.1 (if there had been no reunification shock) and in Romania (with a coercive policy) plus 0.2 could be assessed. In the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia no long-term effect was found.

The Hungarian demographers claim that without their population policy fertility decline would have been stronger (see also Höhn, 1987). This might also be true for East Germany. It remains to be seen whether and when the deep fall of fertility in East Germany will be overcome.

Effects of Other Policies

So far no quantitative studies on the effects of indirect policies are available. But it can be assumed that these effects are large. Kaufmann summarizes the negative effects of the welfare state and the flourishing economy on fertility under the notion of "structural ruthlessness".

A serious obstacle to the development of a comprehensive pro-natalist policy arises in already ageing populations. The competition for resources between advocates of expenditures in social security and those aiming at pro-natalist policies is already acute and has largely been at the expense of the latter. One of the main reasons is that the elderly are voters while children are not. Another reason is that social security has to be maintained. This political dilemma is not easy to overcome, but perhaps worth more attention.

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Indicators of nuptiality in the old federal territory and in the former GDR, 1950-1995

Year	Marriages per 1 000 population	Total first marriage rates of 100 never-married ... would marry				Mean age at first marriage					
		Men		Women		Men		Women			
		old federal territory	former GDR	Germany old federal territory	former GDR	old federal territory	former GDR	Germany old federal territory	former GDR	Germany	
1950	10.7	11.7		135	105	112	96	28.1	26.1	25.4	24.0
1955	8.8	8.7		107	105	105	96	27.0	24.6	24.4	23.2
1960	9.4	9.7		106	101	106	105	25.9	23.9	23.7	22.5
1965	8.3	7.6		91	86	110	105	26.0	24.2	23.7	22.9
1970	7.3	7.7		90	101	97	98	25.6	24.0	23.0	21.9
1975	6.3	8.4		73	88	76	92	25.3	23.2	22.7	21.3
1980	5.9	8.0		64	79	66	81	26.1	23.4	23.4	21.3
1985	6.0	7.9		58	70	60	74	27.2	24.3	24.6	22.2
1986	6.1	8.3		58	73	60	78	27.5	24.6	24.9	22.5
1987	6.3	8.5		59	74	61	81	27.7	24.8	25.2	22.7
1988	6.5	8.2		61	71	63	78	28.0	25.0	25.5	22.9
1989	6.4	7.9		60	68	63	76	28.2	25.3	25.7	23.2
1990	6.6	6.3	6.5	60	58	64	64	28.4	25.8	25.9	23.7
1991	6.3	3.2	5.7	57	28	62	31	28.7	26.6	26.3	24.5
1992	6.2	3.0	5.6	56	28	62	32	29.0	27.1	26.5	25.1
1993	6.0	3.1	5.5	54	29	61	34	29.3	27.6	26.9	25.5
1994	5.9	3.4	5.4	53	32	60	38	29.6	28.0	27.2	26.0
1995	5.7	3.5	5.3					29.9	28.5	27.5	26.4

Source: Federal Statistical Office, own calculations

Indicators of fertility in the old federal territory and in the former GDR, 1950-1995

Year	Births per 1 000 population	Total fertility rate		Net reproduction rate		Illegitimacy ratio			
		old federal territory	former GDR Germany	old federal territory	former GDR Germany	old federal territory	former GDR Germany		
1950	16.2	16.5	2.09	2.37	0.93	1.13	9.7	12.8	
1960	17.4	17.0	2.36	2.33	1.10	1.07	6.3	11.6	
1970	13.4	13.9	2.01	2.19	0.95	1.04	5.5	13.3	
1975	9.7	10.8	1.45	1.54	0.69	0.73	6.1	16.1	
1980	10.1	14.6	1.44	1.94	0.68	0.93	7.6	22.8	
1981	10.1	14.2	1.43	1.85	0.67	0.89	7.9	25.6	
1982	10.1	14.4	1.41	1.86	0.66	0.89	8.5	29.3	
1983	9.7	14.0	1.33	1.79	0.63	0.85	8.8	32.0	
1984	9.5	13.7	1.29	1.74	0.61	0.83	9.1	33.6	
1985	9.6	13.7	1.28	1.73	0.60	0.84	9.4	33.8	
1986	10.3	13.4	1.34	1.70	0.63	0.81	9.6	34.4	
1987	10.5	13.6	1.37	1.74	0.64	0.83	9.7	32.8	
1988	11.0	12.9	1.41	1.67	0.66	0.81	10.0	33.4	
1989	11.0	12.0	1.39	1.57	0.67	0.75	10.2	33.6	
1990	11.5	11.1	1.45	1.52	0.69	0.73	10.5	35.0	15.3
1991	11.3	6.8	1.42	0.98	0.68	0.47	11.1	41.7	15.1
1992	11.1	5.6	1.40	0.83	0.67	0.40	11.6	41.8	14.9
1993	10.9	5.1	1.40	0.77	0.67	0.37	11.9	41.1	14.8
1994	10.5	5.1	1.40	0.77	0.64	0.37	12.4	41.4	15.4
1995	10.3	5.4	1.31*)	0.81*)	0.64	0.37	12.9	41.8	16.1

Source: Federal Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbooks of GDR, own calculations
*) estimated